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(1) the reasonable sort, whereby we accede to 
rational arguments (2) the sort that is triggered by 
external circumstances, such as overhearing a 
rumor; (3) the sort that is prompted by our 
submission to something within ourselves, such 
as a habit formed by past actions; (4) the sort that 
results from a sudden change of mood such as 
might be caused by a feeling of grief; and (5) the 
rare sort that is a consequence of our own voluntary 
choice, which will be identified as the “will to 
believe.” 

 
William James, 1890
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The transition from reflex action to volitional is not 
abrupt and sharp. Familiar instances of individual 
acquisition of motor coordination are furnished by 
the cases in which short, simple movements, 
whether reflex or not, are by practice under volition 
combined into new sequences and become in 
time habitual in the sense that though able to be 
directed they no longer require concentration of 
attention upon them for their execution. 
Charles Sherrington, 1906
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Decision making
Brain is optional 
• Decision-making without a brain: how an amoeboid organism solves the two-armed bandit (2016) 
Chris R. Reid, Hannelore MacDonald, Richard P. Mann, James A. R. Marshall, Tanya Latty, Simon Garnier 
• Habituation in non-neural organisms: Evidence from slime moulds (2016) 
Romain P. Boisseau, David Vogel & Audrey Dussutour 
• A two-neuron system for adaptive goal-directed decision-making in Lymnaea (2016) 
Crossley M., Staras K., Kemenes G. 
• Functional organization and adaptability of a decision-making network in Aplysia (2012) 
Nargeot R., Simmers J. 
• Neuronal microcircuits for decision making in C. Elegans (2012) 
Faumont S., Lindsay T.H., Lockery, S. R. 
• Decision-making in soccer game: a developmental perspective (2005) 
Rulence-Pâquesa P., Frucharta E., Drub V., Mullet E. 
Decision making
Rougier & Hutt, 2012 
A dual particle system (degenerated neural field)  
whose initial state governs final state. 
dx/dt = α(1 − x) + (x − y)(1 − x), x > 0  
dy/dt = α(1 − y) + (y − x)(1 − y), y > 0  
Noise (i.e. initial position) induces symmetry 
breaking and final decision.
The executive decision maker 
Brazil, Terry Gilliam, 1985
Decision making
The habit factor
The habit factor
A tentative definition 
Yin and Knowlton (2006), Graybiel (2008), Seger and Spiering (2011) 
• Elicited by a particular context or stimulus 
→ stimulus-response as opposed to action-outcome 
• Acquired via experience  
→ require extensive training or repetition 
• Performed automatically 
→ the mere presence of the stimulus induces the response 
• Resistant to outcome devaluation  
→ disengagement from the goal 
• Performed unconsciously 
→ without “thinking” about it 
XKCD #242
A simple question
Action-outcome then stimulus-response?

Action-outcome comes first until being transformed into stimulus-response 
Action-outcome versus stimulus-response?

Both processes are present and compete for expression 
Action-outcome with stimulus-response?

Final decision is a mix of both processes 
Action-outcome and stimulus-response?

Processes cooperate and influence each other, always 
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Cortex (CTX) 
• Posterior

• Motor / Premotor

• Prefrontal

Thalamus (THL) 
Amygdala (AMY) 
Striatum (STR) 
• Caudate

• Putamen

• Nucleus Accumbens

Subthalamic Nucleus (STN)

Globus Pallidus 
• Internal (GPi)

• External (GPe)

Subtantia Nigra 
• pars Compacta (SNc)

• pars Reticulata (SNr)
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Direct pathway (go pathway) 
CTX → STR → GPi/SNr → THL → CTX

Indirect pathway (no go pathway) 
CTX → STR → GPe → GPi/SNr → THL → CTX 
                                 → STN → THL → CTX

Hyperdirect pathway (stop pathway) 
CTX → STN → GPi/SNr → THL → CTX

Segregated loops
Dopamine as RPE
Sutton & Barto, 1998 Schulz et al., 1997
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“A broad range of neural and behavioral data 
suggests that the brain contains multiple systems 
for behavioral choice, including one associated with 
prefrontal cortex and another with dorsolateral 
striatum. However, such a surfeit of control raises 
an additional choice problem: how to arbitrate 
between the systems when they disagree. Here, we 
consider dual-action choice systems from a 
normative perspective, using the computational 
theory of reinforcement learning. We identify a key 
trade-off pitting computational simplicity against the 
flexible and statistically efficient use of experience. 
The trade-off is realized in a competition between 
the dorsolateral striatal and prefrontal systems…”
Daw et al. (2005)
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Action
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System
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System
Dezfouli et al. (2013)
“… Model-based reinforcement learning (RL) has 
been argued to underlie the goal-directed process; 
however, the way in which it interacts with habits 
and the structure of the habitual process has 
remained unclear. According to a flat architecture, 
the habitual process corresponds to model-free RL, 
and its interaction with the goal-directed process is 
coordinated by an external arbitration mechanism. 
Alternatively, the interaction between these 
systems has recently been argued to be 
hierarchical, such that the formation of action 
sequences underlies habit learning and a goal-
directed process selects between goal-directed 
actions and habitual sequences of actions to reach 
the goal…”
Action
(explicit) 
Selection
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Fastest
Action
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System
Ashby et al. (2007)
“… The model assumes 2 neural pathways from 
sensory association cortex to the premotor area 
that mediates response selection. A longer and 
slower path projects to the premotor area via the 
striatum, globus pallidus, and thalamus. A faster, 
purely cortical path projects directly to the 
premotor area. The model assumes that the 
subcortical path has greater neural plasticity 
because of a dopamine-mediated learning signal 
from the substantia nigra. In contrast, the cortical-
cortical path learns more slowly via (dopamine 
independent) Hebbian learning…”
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“… Said differently, we managed to explicitly 
dissociate reinforcement learning from Hebbian 
learning and demonstrated covert learning inside 
the basal ganglia. These results suggest that a 
behavioral decision results from both the 
cooperation (acquisition) and competition 
(expression) of two distinct but entangled memory 
systems, the goal-directed system and the habit 
system that may represent the two ends of the 
same graded phenomenon. 
Action
Cooperation
“Slow”

Competition
Piron et al. (2016)
→ Humans 
→ Monkeys 
→ Rodents  
→ Birds (Krebs et al. 1978)  
→ Fish (Thomas et al. 1985)  
→ Bees (Keasar et al. 2002) 
→ Slime mould (Reid et al. 2016) 
→ Photon (Naruse et al. 2015)
Saline or muscimol injection
 into the internal part of
the Globus Pallidus (GPi)
15 minutes before session
Cue presentation
(1.0 - 1.5 second)
Trial Start
(0.5 - 1.5 second)
Decision
(1.0 - 1.5 second)
Go Signal
Reward
Up
Down
Left
Right
Reward (juice) delivered
according to the reward
probability associated
with the chosen stimulus
Control
P=0.75
P=0.25
Two-armed bandit
Two-armed bandit
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Adjustable cues 
Leblois et al. 
(2006)
TOPALIDOU et al. 
(2015) 
(200 LINES of python)
Missing in Action 
(few lines of C)
GUTHRIE et al. 
(2013)
DEAD 
(6000 Lines of Delphi)
PIRON et al. 
(2016)
Topalidou et al. 
(in prep)
…
We redo
 Science !
escobar et al., 2016  
NALLAPU eT AL., 2016 
CARREIRE ET AL., 2015
A long series…
We redo
 Science !
ReScience 
Reproducible science is good. Replicated science is better.
R E S C I E N C E . G I T H U B . I O
OPEN DATA OPEN SOURCE 
OPEN PEER-REVIEW 
OPEN (GREEN) ACCESS 
NO “BUZZ” BARRIER 
COMMUNITY SUPPORTED 
0€ BUDGET
REGIST
ER AS R
EVIEWE
R 
AND YO
U CAN G
AIN 
FAME, F
ORTUNE
, SUCCE
SS 
OR … 
A NICE 
STICKER
 ! 
(YES ! A
 STICKE
R !)
BENOÎT G. 
RESCIENCE CHANGED MY LIFE
MEHDI K. 
IT REALLY W
ORKS !
XAVIER H. 
TOTALLY WORTH IT !
A unit is a set of arbitrary values that can vary along time under the influence of other units 
and learning.  
• Distributed 
    → no supervisor 
• Asynchronous 
    → no central clock 
• Numerical 
    → no symbol 
• Adaptative 
    → to learn something 
 
 
We want to make sure that emerging properties are those of the model and not those of 
the software running the model. 
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Computational model
Dopamine + Reinforcement learning

• Cognitive cortex to cognitive striatum 
• Motor cortex to motor striatum
Lateral Competition + Hebbian learning

• Cognitive cortex to associative cortex 
• Motor cortex to associative cortex
Lesion

• Motor GPi to motor thalamus 
• Cognitive GPi to cognitive thalamus
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Intact model (GPi On)

Faster decision (before learning)
Lesioned model (GPi Off)

Slower decision (before learning)
Habit learning
Saline / GPi ON Muscimol / GPi OFF
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Conclusion
Habit acquisition and habit expression 
→ These are two different processes even though they’re entangled 
→ Basal ganglia serves as an implicit supervisor 
→ Habit can be expressed outside BG (at least in the primate) 
  
The critic role of the BG 
→ Basal ganglia serves as a generic critic, for any “actor” 
→ No experimental evidence yet for the role of the cortex 
→ Ongoing experiments to measure RL vs HL influence on behavior 
Habits are a graded phenomenon
Goal directed HabitsConsolidation Time XKCD #1066
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